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This paper investigates the quality implications of an upper limit on product
prices in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly. It is shown that a price ceiling
diminishes the incentives for strategic product diﬀerentiation, thereby improv-
ing average quality in the market.
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1. Introduction
Upper limits on product prices can be observed for a number of goods including, e.g.,
housing, food, drugs or utilities. While such regulations are often justiﬁed by the
desire to prevent customers from paying ’too’ high prices, there is also widespread
belief that this comes at the cost of deteriorating product quality.1
It is the purpose of this article to revisit this belief in the framework of a vertically
diﬀerentiated duopoly. We show that price ceilings appear in a somewhat diﬀer-
ent light, when their strategic implications are taken into account. As commonly
known (d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982), the
laissez-faire equilibrium in ﬁrst-quality-then-price games displays maximal quality
diﬀerentiation, as this allows ﬁrms to charge highest prices. However, the imposition
of an eﬀective price ceiling hinders ﬁrms from achieving these prices, which in turn
diminishes the incentives to provide diﬀering qualities. In particular, the low-quality
ﬁrm is shown to enhance its quality compared to laissez-faire, whereas the choice
of the high quality ﬁrm remains unaﬀected. As a consequence, an upper limit on
product prices improves average quality in the market.
To the best of our knowledge, prior research has devoted no attention to a theo-
retical investigation of price ceilings on product quality in an oligopolistic setting.
Previous studies have shed light on either monopolistic (Besanko, Donnenfeld and
White, 1987) or competitive markets (Raymon, 1986), where the strategic inter-
action between ﬁrms is absent. Focussing on the repercussion of price regulation
on product quality, our approach diﬀers also distinctively from models of minimum
quality standards (see, e.g., Ronnen, 1991), where quality is directly aﬀected by
regulatory constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the basic features of the
model and establishes the eﬀects of price ceilings on equilibrium qualities. Section
3 concludes.
1 See, e.g., Albon and Staﬀord (1987) in the context of rent ceilings.- Price Ceilings and Quality Competition - 2
2. The model
Consider a model of a vertically diﬀerentiated market inspired by Shaked and Sutton
(1982) and Tirole (1988) with two ﬁrms i = 1;2, where j 6= i denotes the competitor.
Each ﬁrm produces a good of quality si 2 [s¡;s+]. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i is: Πi = piDi,
where pi and Di denote price and demand of its product.2 Demand for each ﬁrm is
determined by the choices of consumers, their total number being normalized to 1.
The utility of a consumer buying a product from ﬁrm i amounts to Ui(µ) = µsi¡pi;
where µ, the marginal utility of quality, diﬀers among individuals. To simplify
matters, we assume that µ is uniformly distributed in the interval [µ¡;µ+], with
1 > µ¡ > 0 and µ+ = µ¡ + 1. Furthermore, we assume that every consumer buys
exactly one unit, and makes a mutually exclusive choice between the two ﬁrms.3
The sequence of events is as follows. At stage 1, ﬁrms decide simultaneously on the
quality si of their product. At stage 2, they set the corresponding prices pi. At
stage 3, consumers make their choice.
Looking for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we ﬁrst derive the demand func-
tions by considering the consumers’ problem at stage 3. Prices and qualities are ﬁxed
then, so one can easily determine the condition for the type ˜ µ, indiﬀerent between
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Without loss of generality, we assume s2 ¸ s1. Thus, whenever ﬁrms supply diﬀerent
qualities, ﬁrm 2 is the high-quality and ﬁrm 1 is the low-quality ﬁrm. Demand results
as D2 = 1 + µ¡ ¡ ˜ µ;D1 = ˜ µ ¡ µ¡.
At stage 2, ﬁrms engage in price competition and maximize proﬁts by choosing pi,
subject to the premise that product prices must not exceed an exogenously imposed
level ¯ p > 0. Product qualities are ﬁxed at this stage. This leads to the following
2 As usual in the referring literature, production costs are neglected. We discuss this assumption
in the conclusions section.
3 This is another common assumption in the literature (Tirole, 1988; Cremer and Thisse, 1991).
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Equation (1) shows that the eﬀectiveness of the price regulation is governed by
the quality diﬀerential 4s = (s2 ¡ s1), with the ceiling becoming eﬀective only if
qualities diﬀer suﬃciently: 4s >
3¯ p
(2+µ¡). See Figure 1 for an equilibrium with such
a binding price limit. At this stage, two things are worth noting: First, the price
limit imposes a direct upper bound only for ﬁrm 2 as ﬁrm 1 must charge a lower
price in order to attract any consumers. Nevertheless, a tighter price ceiling reduces
also p1, due to the strategic complementarity in prices. Second, the price ceiling
modiﬁes the price eﬀects of the quality diﬀerential. With an ineﬀective regulation,
product diﬀerentiation allows both ﬁrms to increase prices. However, when the
ceiling is binding, a higher quality diﬀerential does not aﬀect the decision of ﬁrm 2,
but reduces the price set by the lower quality ﬁrm.
Taking these repercussions into account, ﬁrms choose qualities at the ﬁrst stage.
Maximizing Π2(s1;s2) = p¤
2D2(p¤
1(s1;s2);p¤
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The ﬁrst-order condition reveals that the choice of quality is inﬂuenced by both a
direct and a strategic eﬀect. The direct eﬀect p¤
2
@D2
@s2 , the inﬂuence of the change in
ﬁrm 2’s quality on its demand, is positive, creating an incentive to increase quality.
However, the sign of the strategic eﬀect, measuring how a change in own quality
aﬀects demand through changing the competitor’s price via the quality diﬀerential,
depends on whether the price ceiling is eﬀective or not: With an ineﬀective regu-
lation, ﬁrm 1 responds to a higher quality diﬀerential by charging a higher price.
Then, the strategic eﬀect is positive. The opposite holds when the price ceiling
is binding, for ﬁrm 1 cuts its price in such a situation. However, the direct eﬀect
always dominates the strategic eﬀect, thus choosing the highest possible quality is
always worthwhile for ﬁrm 2, as illustrated in Figure 2, where for ease of exposition,
the quality bounds s¡;S+ have been omitted.4
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0 : s1 < s2 ¡
¯ p
µ¡:
As can be seen from Figure 3, ﬁrm 1 proﬁts from decreasing quality as long as the
quality diﬀerential is so low that the ceiling is ineﬀective.5 This holds because the loss
in demand incurred by providing lower quality at given prices (direct eﬀect) is lower





, because for every s2 > s1 +
¯ p
µ¡
both the direct and the strategic eﬀect become zero, for ﬁrm 1 is driven out of the market.
Thus, there exists a continuum of proﬁt maximizing qualities.
5 Again, the technological quality bounds are not drawn into the ﬁgure.- Price Ceilings and Quality Competition - 5
than the demand gained by inducing ﬁrm 2 to set a higher price (strategic eﬀect).
However, providing an even lower quality it is not advantageous for the strategic
eﬀect vanishes when the ceiling is eﬀective:
dp¤
2
d4s = 0. No additional demand can be
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When the price ceiling is high enough such that it is ineﬀective in equilibrium
(laissez-faire competition), the market displays maximal diﬀerentiation (d’Aspre-
mont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982). That is, in order to
relax price competition and to prevent the Bertrand zero-proﬁt outcome, ﬁrms have
an incentive to diﬀerentiate themselves as much as possible with respect to quality.
A tighter ceiling diminishes these incentives, leading to the following
Proposition. The imposition of a binding price ceiling increases the quality pro-
vided by the low-quality ﬁrm compared to laissez-faire price competition. The quality
chosen by the high-quality ﬁrm remains unaﬀected. Thus, the ceiling increases av-
erage quality in the market.
3. Conclusion
We have addressed the question how a price ceiling aﬀects product quality. In
contrast to previous research we have incorporated strategic behavior both in prices
and qualities in a vertical diﬀerentiation duopoly model. Altering the strategic
eﬀects, an upper limit on prices is found to improve average product quality. In
particular, the strategic eﬀect is eliminated for the low-quality ﬁrm.6
The fact that ﬁrms diﬀerentiate themselves to a lower extent than under laissez-faire
competition is reminiscent of the loss of product diversity in models of horizontal dif-
ferentiation when price competition becomes absent (Hotelling, 1929; d’Aspremont,
6 This fact leads us to conclude that a similar quality-enhancing eﬀect of price ceilings arises also
for non-uniform distributions of consumer preferences.- Price Ceilings and Quality Competition - 6
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). As Cremer and Thisse (1991) have pointed out,
some classes of vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation models are equivalent. How-
ever, our model does not fulﬁll their equivalence condition. Furthermore, there exists
a general diﬀerence between horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation models in terms
of price regulation. Contrary to a horizontally diﬀerentiated duopoly, where both
ﬁrms choose identical equilibrium prices, price ceilings aﬀect ﬁrms asymmetrically
in vertical diﬀerentiation models. This is, roughly speaking, due to the fact that for
identical prices consumers’ choices diﬀer among products in horizontal diﬀerentiation
models, whereas they coincide in vertical diﬀerentiation models. Consequently, the
low-quality ﬁrm has to charge lower prices than the high-quality ﬁrm and the ceiling
becomes binding only for the latter. This eﬀect, which is absent in Hotelling-type
models, is responsible for our quality improvement result.
In accordance with much of the literature (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988, Wauthy, 1996),
we have highlighted the strategic ramiﬁcations by abstracting from costs of quality
choice. Obviously, when such costs are considered, ﬁrms have to weigh them against
direct and strategic eﬀects in their quality choices. However, as long as quality is
not too costly and the ceiling is not too tight, an upper limit on prices has still a
positive impact on the average quality of products in the market.- Price Ceilings and Quality Competition - 7
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Figure 3: Proﬁt as a function of quality for ﬁrm 1
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Figure 4: Equilibrium qualities